This article focuses on apartheid South Africa's participation in United Nations-organised international environmental initiatives in the 1970s in order to reassess contemporary and historiographical views that the country was an extremely reluctant participant in UN-led environmental initiatives in the 1970s because it threatened the country's policy of uncontrolled economic growth and promoted the environment as a political issue, and because the country was not allowed to participate in many of these UN initiatives owing to its isolation within this world body. Utilising archival evidence this article clearly demonstrates that the processes whereby the country decided whether or not to participate in specific UN-organised international environmental initiatives in the 1970s were very complex and conflicting, and in general did not result from a lack of governmental commitment to address the country's multiple environmental challenges. The main argument of this article is that South Africa's limited participation in UN-organised international environmental initiatives in the 1970s resulted from two reasons, namely the mutual distrust between the country and the UN which reached new lows as the 1970s progressed, and the prevailing South African foreign policy strategy of deliberately keeping a low profile in order to avoid confrontation on the international stage
and South Africa's refusal to grant South West Africa (now Namibia) independence. Even though opposition to South Africa in the UN was limited for the first 14 years, compared to the hostility that followed the violent suppression of the anti-pass march in Sharpeville in 1960, relations were already so strained by the mid-1950s that the country withdrew from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (hereafter UNESCO) in 1955 and the UN General Assembly on 27 November 1956 in reaction to sustained attacks on the country's race policies. 7 Thereafter the country maintained only a token representation at the UN until active participation was restored on 24 September 1958 after the '…government was innovation and imagination over a wide front in the Department'. 13 Fourie's cautious style permeated throughout the whole Department of Foreign Affairs and by the 1970s the country's diplomats went out of their way not to draw unwanted attention to the country and its racial policies, even if this meant self-isolation. This approach to international relations would have far-reaching consequences for South Africa's participation in UN-organised international environmental initiatives in the 1970s, as will be discussed. It seems that South African came late to the UNCHE party. The first reference to this important event within the documentation of the Department of Planning occurs only on 26
February 1971 in a memo written by J. Claassen, the Chief Director of the Department of Planning. In this Claassen noted that seen from a global perspective, UNCHE might serve a very good purpose. However, with the massive rallies against the Springbok rugby tour to Britain in 1969/70 still fresh in the mind, he did note that problems might occur and that the conference had the potential to become a platform for attacks against South Africa. He singled out two issues that had the potential to become problematic: firstly, the Declaration on the Human Environment, since it sought to regulate the relationship not only between individuals, but more importantly between the state and individuals, and secondly, the focus on physical planning and patterns of population settlement.
14 From the sources consulted, it is unclear to what extent the Department of Planning really viewed these and other potential political problems associated with South Africa's participation at UNCHE as problematic, or if they merely paid lip service to the Department of Foreign Affairs and cabinet's preoccupation with not drawing unwanted attention to the country's apartheid policies. The threat of potential political problems, however, in no way dissuaded those dealing with UNCHE in the Department of Planning from their view that South Africa should attend the conference, and that the delegation should be led by scientific and policy experts from their department. 15 This much was made clear, for example, in a subsequent memo written by Claassen in which he set out the reasons for and the organisation of UNCHE, and recommended that cabinet approval be obtained for South 23 In 1957 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw, expressed the hope that the country's economic and scientific power could make South Africa a 'permanent link between the Western nations on the one hand and the population of Africa south of the Sahara on the other hand'. As Barber and Barratt note, through this process of co-operation on technical, scientific and economic matters, the apartheid government had hoped that African states would come to realise that apartheid was not a threat to them. Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 38 (includes Eric Louw quote). 24 Like many other countries, high levels of especially visible pollution became a state and public concern in South Africa at the end of the 1960s, with special attention directed at water, air, noise, marine, electronic, radio-active and radiation pollution and environmental marring. The government reacted to scientific investigations into the state of pollution in the country by strengthening existing anti-pollution laws (e.g. Our delegation [to UNCHE] should go fully prepared to make a positive, contribution that would be worthy of the most highly developed country in Africa. If circumstances appear to be favourable after arrival of our delegation at the conference the delegation should participate as fully and effectively as circumstances permit. If, on the other hand, the assessment is that it would be better for us not to be too much in evidence we should attend quietly and simply observe the proceedings for we, on our part, would be able to learn much, especially from the other developed countries to be represented there. The
issues are important and we should not be kept away by fears of possible political action against us.
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The expected political problems materialised even before the conference started when eight Africa appears only twice in the official UNCHE records. Firstly, the country entered a reservation on Principle 1 of the Declaration on the Human Environment that condemned all policies promoting apartheid, racial discrimination and any form of colonialism, since it felt that this constituted interference in the domestic affairs of a member state of the UN which was against the Charter of this organisation. Secondly, the country opposed a call for a total ban on commercial whale hunting, which objection in all probability had much more to do with openly showing support to Japan, which at that stage was still a largely uncritical major trading partner of the country, than protecting a rapidly dying whaling industry in South Africa.
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Given the attendance of a large number of African delegates at the conference, it was not surprising that the country's apartheid policies did come under attack at UNCHE. This was led by the leader of the Tanzanian delegation, Dr W.K. Chugula, who publicly condemned apartheid, racial and colonial oppression as the 'very core of environmental problems in Africa due to the degradation they cause to human resources by taking away rights of many and thereby bringing benefits to only a minority'. 34 Even those water development projects that the South African government was very proud of at the time, such as the Cabora Bassa 'whose purpose is to perpetuate a system of human degradation, discrimination and colonial domination'.
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The observer role performed by Rautenbach and the other three delegates at UNCHE was a far cry from the active role that the Department of Planning and environmental and scientific agencies in South Africa had hoped and prepared for. This role was explained away by accusing the developing world of making the environment an emotional and political issue
(including an anti-apartheid issue) thereby ignoring the 'humble' approach of the developed world which wanted to address the environment as a technical and scientific issue. at the Stockholm Conference in 1972 the opinion was expressed that the time had come for the world to tackle the growing problem of pollution...South Africa must adopt the attitude that as we are part of the world we ought to do something about pollution as well. We must not have a negative approach to this and anything we can do can only benefit us in the long run if it helps make the world a better place for all to live in. Leaving UNEP would certainly not be any advantage to us. 73 Given the real political isolation of the country on an international level by the late 1970s and 1980s, these few opportunities for the country to cooperate 'normally' with other global actors became very important to the South African government, both for their obvious scientific benefit but also for propaganda reasons. 74 In the course of the 1980s these few areas in which the country was able to operate internationally were consistently used in government propaganda as 'evidence' that the country was still an international player and not the 'abnormal society' that most of the world had come to oppose. 
